Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 5

6-1-1999

Rules and Reversibility
Clayton P. Gillette

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Clayton P. Gillette, Rules and Reversibility, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1415 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol72/iss5/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 5

RULES AND REVERSIBILITY
Clayton P. Gillette*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the value of legal rules evolves from their probabilistic
nature. The fact that the factual predicate for a rule, to use Frederick
Schauer's terms,' bears a probable causal relationship to the rule's
justification means that we believe that in a substantial majority of the
cases to which that rule is applied, i.e., presumptively, its application
will advance a desired objective, and that it was in light of that objective that the rule was initially formulated. This relationship between
the rule and some preferred outcome distinguishes legal rules from,
for instance, the rules of a game that may simply be constituitive of
the game and that might be altered without affecting the value of
game playing (but that would mean a different game was being
played). The value of the presumption lies in the fact that it advances
the desired objective without requiring a more costly ad hoc application of the justification to the facts and consequences of individual
cases. Legal rules thus serve as rough proxies or surrogates given
either the inability or undesirability of defining or implementing a
completely contingent specification of the circumstances that would
lead us to regulate behavior. The presumptive nature of the rule indicates that there is some epistemic uncertainty about whether application of the rule will, in fact, vindicate its underlying justification in the
individual case; indeed, the fact that the rule is only presumptive
means that we are aware that strict application will occasionally generate undesirable results. But our reliance on rules suggests that the
probability of the desired coincidence is sufficiently high to make
more particularistic inquiries or more highly tailored formulations of
the rule wasteful and to make the occasional losses that result from
inappropriate application worth incurring.
That, at least, is the story we tell ourselves about the way in which
legal rules operate. Thus, for instance, the ability of courts and legis*
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latures to describe conditions that track the desired objective of the
law underlies much of the literature comparing rules and standards.
But relationships between factual predicates for rules and theirjustifications are not necessarily stable. The fact that a relationship exists at
the time that the rule is first promulgated does not mean that the
same relationship will be maintained throughout the period that the
rule applies. That truism seems to pose little more than an inevitable
difficulty for legal rules, as long as they are implemented in an environment that sufficiently permits decisionmakers to adjust them, just
as claims of changed circumstances that disrupt contractual expectations occasionally permit adjustment of contractual terms. 2 At least in
theory, there is little to prevent modification of legal rules when refinement is necessary to maintain the relationship between factual
predicate and justification. Statutes can be amended to provide exceptions, to add safe harbors that reduce uncertainty about compliance, 3 or to redefine the conditions of liability or regulation. Courts
can adjust both statutes and common law principles on an ad hoc
basis in the face of circumstances deemed beyond the consideration
4
of those who initially formulated the rule.
The probabilistic nature of rules, however, becomes more problematic if there is something inherent in a rule that makes it difficult
to reverse or revise, notwithstanding that it no longer reflects, or it is
determined that it never accurately reflected, the relationship between its factual predicate and its justification. If we believed that
rules were self-perpetuating in this manner, then we might have adjusted the initial statement of the rule in order to take into account
the likelihood that the rule as stated could become both obsolete and
inconsistent with its justification. The possibility that alternative formulations could prevent legal rules from becoming "locked in" is related to questions of institutional design that inhere in the
formulation of legal rules. The less precisely rules are initially stated,
the greater the room for judicial supervision of the fit between rules
and their justification. As courts fill in the details of vague standards,
they have inherent authority to determine whether particular sets of
facts warrant application of the rule, and are likely to investigate the
rule's purpose in making that determination. The more precisely
legal rules are initially stated, however, the less room there is forjudi2 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-615 (1989).
3

See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposalto Improve the Community Rein-

vestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349 (1993).
4 See, e.g., Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939) (reading a customary exception into a statute that did not explicitly include it).
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cial adjustment in the application of the rule. The result is thatjudges
applying precise rules have little incentive to look behind the explicit
terms of the provision to determine whether current conditions warrant its application. Indeed, as I shall argue below, certain formulations of legislatively drafted rules are intended to preclude judicial reexamination.
For instance, assume we believe that today the optimal speed
limit for virtually all automobiles on highways is sixty miles per hour,
but we foresee a time in the near future when improvements in the
engineering of both automobiles and roads would allow safe driving at
speeds up to eighty miles per hour. We might still pass a sixty mile per
hour speed limit today, understanding that we would want to change
it when the expected engineering advances actually occur. But if we
believed there were institutional reasons why a statutory limit will become locked in once promulgated, but that courts might be better
able to adjust to new information, then we might instead favor enactment today of a rule that required driving at a "reasonable" speed.
This reformulation would reflect our confidence that shifting the decision about safe driving speeds from an ex ante analysis made by legislators to an ex post analysis byjudges and juries would generate a more
accurate series of decisions relating permissible driving speeds to safe
driving speeds at any point in time, i.e., sixty miles per hour today, but
eighty miles per hour in the future. In short, the possibility that rules
may be difficult to reverse or revise should affect not only the substance of the rule, but the roles of different decisionmakers, particularly legislators and courts.
In this essay, I explore some situations in which the promulgation
of a rule contains the seeds of its own preservation. I refer to the
capacity of decisionmakers to revisit the probabilistic connection between the factual predicates for a rule and its justification as "reversibility," though I mean that term to include the capacity to revise, as
well as reverse, prior formulations. To some extent, reversibility of
rules depends on the weight that we assign to the presumptiveness of
a rule. The more that the presumptive nature of a rule precludes the
search for exceptions, the more difficult it may be to determine that
reversal or revision is warranted. If we never look to determine
whether conditions have changed, it is less likely that we will discover
changes that have occurred. But I want to make a more subtle claim
about the relationship between the probabilistic nature of rules and
their reversibility. Legal rules, especially those based on presumptions, have multiple sources, and the source of a particular rule at
least indirectly affects our ability to detect whether the factual predicates relied on for the initial articulation of the rule continue to apply.
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The fact that a rule evolves from a particular source may mandate that
rulemaking institutions, courts and legislatures, play discrete roles to
ensure that the rule is drafted and implemented in a manner that is
most likely to satisfy its objectives. Those same institutional roles, however, may preclude reinvestigation of the basis for the rule, even as
they ensure its proper implementation, given the assumptions on
which its initial articulation was based. Thus, my concern is primarily
with the ways in which the sources of rules and the forms in which
they are drafted define institutional arrangements that have the effect
of frustrating reversal when rules have departed from their original
probabilistic moorings.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM

My invocation of institutional design may be read to imply that
the ultimate question to be addressed is whether courts or legislatures
are ultimately more conservative, or whether one or the other is more
likely to privilege the status quo. There are reasons to believe that
each of these institutions bears systemic biases in favor of the status
quo. The conservatism of courts is most apparent in the doctrine of
stare decisis. Notwithstanding that the doctrine is sufficiently malleable to permit courts to avoid precedents when sufficient reasons are
stated, 5 and even when they are not,6 the assumption of stare decisis is
that a prior decision will bind courts with respect to subsequent cases
that are characterized by similar facts. We can, of course, debate the
necessary realm of "similarity," but the fact remains that once courts
following stare decisis find the case before them lies within that realm,
they will not look for independent justifications of the decision they
reach, but simply follow rules previously laid down. The existence of a
doctrine that makes reinvestigation of existing legal doctrines unnecessary or inappropriate necessarily deters those who might otherwise
advocate changes in legal rules and thus imposes a conservative struc7
ture on the legal regime.
5 The malleability of doctrine and the capacity of courts to make fine distinctions has been a hallmark of much of Fred Schauer's work. See, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99
HAgv. L. REV. 361, 370-73 (1985).
6 See Clayton P. Gillette, The PathDependenceof the Law, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES (Steven Burton ed., forthcoming 1998).
7 This conclusion is not intended to suggest that stare decisis is itself inappropriate. Nor do I suggest that the law does not accommodate countervailing influences.
For instance, contingent fees induce some attorneys to take high risk and high payoff
cases, such as those that will be successful only if a change in the legal rule is announced. These inducements create a class of persons (often plaintiffs' lawyers) who
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Stare decisis retards reversibility in an additional way, by reducing
the incentives of those agents subject to the existing rule to initiate
litigation in which courts might revisit the rule. Courts, unlike legislatures, do not initiate reforms on their own. Given that litigation is
costly, litigants and litigators (at least, those who depend on contingent fees) are likely to incur those costs only when offset by expected
benefits. Since stare decisis suggests that courts must follow existing
law without independent justification, those who seek to overturn an
existing rule must demonstrate both that the existing rule fails to
track the underlying justification for it and that they should prevail
under a new rule that better reflects the underlyingjustification. This
additional burden decreases the possibility of success of any legal challenge, hence discouraging those who might otherwise initiate reforms.
The public goods nature of legal rules, of course, enhances this effect,
since potential litigants will obtain the same benefits without incurring the related costs should some other agent succeed in similar litigation. The result is that those who might benefit from a rule change
in a system of stare decisis have some incentive to free ride on the
efforts of others.
The conservatism of legislatures is more complicated. Once a
rule has been enacted, it privileges particular groups that have incentives to maintain the status quo in order to retain those benefits. Of
course, the same rule may disadvantage other groups that would prefer its reversal. Thus, one might think that each group would be successful in certain cases, but that, on balance, statutory law was neither
inherently static nor subject to reversal. Nevertheless, legislatures will
tend to avoid reversal of existing statutes for either of two reasons.
The first reason stems from the psychological phenomenon of loss
aversion. Individuals tend to value entitlements that they possess
more highly than they value the same entitlement if they have not
received it. Hence the value that one is willing to pay for a good or
service will deviate from the value that the same individual is willing to
accept as compensation for the loss of the same good or service. 8 We
see this phenomenon in circumstances as wide-ranging as differential
offer and asking prices for goods in robust markets to differentials in
the judicial award of compensation for out-of-pocket losses and unrealized profits. In the legislative arena, this phenomenon should
have an interest in overturning existing law. The current litigation campaign against
cigarette manufacturers, who have, for the most part, avoided liability under existing
legal rules governing product liability, may be a case in point.
8 See AMos TvERSK & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, RATIONAL CHOICE 62 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986).
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lead an interest group that has previously been granted a legislative
benefit to bid more to retain that benefit than a competing group
would be willing to bid to shift the benefit to itself. The result should
be that even legislators willing to allocate entitlements to the highest
bidder will have little opportunity to reverse the initial assignment.
Indeed, legislators who subsequently reversed their position might be
limited to smaller rewards for their initial decisions, since interest
groups would not be able to ensure that their bids would be amortized
over a sufficiently long period before the legislation they support is
reversed.
Second, the very fact that the first group was able to obtain the
benefit may reflect an organizational advantage that it had over the
latter group. That same organizational advantage, however, should
permit the first group to deflect efforts to strip it of its rewards. Nevertheless, legislators may be more susceptible than courts to revisions
and more susceptible to revisions than to reversals. Because proposals
for revision (unlike reversals) do not seek to overhaul existing statutory schemes, but only to introduce marginal refinements, they are
more likely to privilege particular groups without arousing the ire of
competitors. If the benefits available to other groups are not significantly reduced by the proposed redivision of the statutorily conferred
"pie," then those other groups will be less likely to oppose proposed
refinements. By "refinement," of course, I do not mean to convey anything positive. The very fact that these refinements are likely to be
undertaken at the behest of an unopposed interest group suggests
that the beneficiaries are obtaining discrete benefits by imposing diffuse costs on others. That recipe often means that the costs of legal
change exceed the benefits but that changes are enacted nevertheless
for want of organized opposition. Indeed, proposals for revision are
perhaps most likely to emerge when a relatively entrenched interest
group seeks marginal self-interested adjustments after a period of robust debate has settled fundamental issues that involved potentially
competing groups. 9 The incentives that legislatures have to make revisions that benefit these groups may mean there is a bias against legislative conservatism. But it is anticonservatism of an odd sort, both
because it involves benefits that may tend to be contrary to social wel9 See Clayton P. Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 VA. L. REv.
1853, 1867-69 (1994). The point is an application of Mancur Olson's general theory
that as national economies stabilize, groups that initially faced collective action
problems can create selective incentives that facilitate organization. The result is that
multiple, but noncompeting, groups each have opportunities to obtain selfish benefits at the expense of social welfare. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS 38-41 (1982).
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fare,' 0 and because it is most effective with respect to relatively minor
adjustments.
In addition, there is another type of conservatism or inertia that
is intrinsic in legal rules. Legal rules are themselves often solutions to
collective action problems, insofar as they reduce the need for bargaining among agents and minimize the effects of free riding. Even if
these solutions can be created through voluntary relationships, especially where some individuals thereby gain disproportionately, these
solutions can certainly be facilitated by the presence of a government
actor." And if collective action problems are "solved" by the intervention of individuals with idiosyncratic interests, it is by no means clear
that the solution will be the one favored by the society at large. The
presence of defense manufacturers may be sufficient to ensure that
the public good of armaments is supplied, but it may be supplied at a
level greater than the public needs.
Once rules are promulgated, however, the same collective action
problems reduce incentives to alter rules. As I noted with respect to
stare decisis, the costs related to effecting legal change discourage efforts at revision unless there exist offsetting benefits that cannot otherwise be obtained. The possible free riding problem is exacerbated if
existing rules are imperfect, though "good enough," since the benefits
to be gained by participating in efforts to make marginal improvements are smaller than they would be if the public good is not being
produced at all. Thus, at least with respect to modifications, legal
rules have their own inertial quality.
These systemic tendencies towards conservatism, however, are
not my primary concern in this essay. These tendencies are exogenous to the structure of the rule of law at issue and thus apply with
equal force to all legal rules. My concern here is with particular forms
of legal rules that have unique, or at least nonsystemic, implications
for reversibility. My claim is that the design or source of some legal
rules entails that different rulemaking institutions will play roles in
10 The fact that a discrete interest group prefers a particular benefit does not
mean that conferral of that benefit is contrary to social welfare. The group may be
acting altruistically, or it may be that the private benefits that the group desires can
only be obtained if it simultaneously generates benefits to others. Think, for instance,
of the successes of environmental groups that may be motivated by the desire of entrepreneurs to obtain fame or to increase federal spending on habitats in which they
have an idiosyncratically intense interest, for example, wilderness areas.
11 For discussions of private solutions to collective action problems, see, for example, ANTHONY DEJAsAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT,FREE RIDE (1989); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES
AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION (1986); MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION

(1976).
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determining whether existing rules will be reversed. If the nature of
the legal rule deters those institutions best able to determine that reversal of the extant rule is appropriate, then the inertial effects of the
legal rule may exert more conservative force than institutional tendencies standing alone. It is to that possibility that I now turn.

III.

THE PROBABILISTIC NATURE OF RULES AND OPTIMAL PRECISION

The probabilistic relationship between factual predicates and justifications informs the precision with which we draft legal rules. Because rules impose costs on those who must live under them, are
costly to draft, and are costly to implement, we typically prefer to regulate only when regulation will produce compensating benefits. Different formulations, however, can be used to regulate the same activity.
We can, for instance, deter undesirable levels of pollution by making
ex ante investigations into emissions levels and safety hazards related to
different pollutants and generating a schedule of emissions for a variety of pollutants, or by prohibiting "dangerous" or "unreasonable"
levels of emissions with the specific levels to be determined ex post, or
by some combination. Our resolution of the degree of precision with
which to draft rules ideally takes into account all the costs related to
their existence: the costs of drafting, of implementing, and of enforcing the rule, including the costs related to restricting the freedom of
those who would otherwise act in a manner inconsistent with the regulations.1 2 The precision of the rule also has implications for the roles
of institutions involved in the process of rule drafting and implementation. A vague standard to drive at a reasonable speed under the
circumstances can be legislatively drafted with greater ease than a rule
that seeks to define reasonableness under a variety of circumstances,
but can only be judicially implemented with difficulty, as fact finders
must determine ex post what "reasonableness" dictated in the situation
before them. Thus, legislative and judicial roles vary with the formulation of the regulation to induce safe driving. The more we believe
that a highly tailored rule will fit a broad category of cases (that is, that
"one size fits all"), or that drafting with precision was inexpensive, or
12 On the optimal level of precision, see Ian Ayres, PreliminaryThoughts on Optimal
Tailoring of ContractualRules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 1 (1993); Colin S. Diver, The
Optimal Precisionof AdministrativeRules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard
A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards,and Precautionsin Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181
(1996); Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on
Precisionin the Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 541; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560, 566 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).

1997]

RULES AND

REVERSIBILITY

1423

that agents subject to rules would have difficulty predicting what is
expected of them without substantial guidance, the more we might
favor legislative statements of precise rules rather than ex postjudicial
applications of relatively vague standards.' 3 The more we think that
application of the legal standard will require consideration of different factors in different situations, or that the costs of intricate rule
drafting could not be amortized over a significant number of cases, or
that vague directives give agents a sufficient conception of what constitutes compliance, the more we might prefer judicial application of a
relatively nebulous standard. In each case, however, the underlying
assumption is that the statement of the rule creates a causal connection between the factual predicate of the rule and its justification with
an optimal level of precision. Whether formulated in the final instance by legislators or by courts at the point of application, rules that
fail to reflect that nexus with the optimal level of precision will generate costs in excess of the benefits they provide.
Take, for instance, Schauer's example of a rule that emanates
from a black Scottish terrier named Angus misbehaving in a restaurant. 14 Schauer suggests if the proprietor of the restaurant were to
impose a "No dogs allowed" rule, that rule would satisfy the probabilistic criterion if it were the "dogness" of Angus that led it to misbehave.
But if the proprietor mistook Angus's "blackness" or its name "Angus"
to be the cause of misbehavior and were subsequently to bar all black
things from the restaurant or all things named Angus, we would not
have any less of a rule. We would only have a rule that was unlikely to
satisfy its objective of precluding the misbehavior that led to the creation of the rule.' 5 Because the rule did not emerge from some probabilistic relationship between its factual predicate and its justification,
the benefits sought to be generated by the rule (minimizing dog-related annoyances in restaurants) will not be realized (because if, for
instance, the rule excludes things that are black, disruptive brown
dogs are not excluded), while the costs of the regulation (excluding
13 On the use of rules versus standards depending on whether ex post versus ex
ante inquiries are more appropriate, see Kaplow, supra note 12, at 586-601.
14 See SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 25-31.
15 Much of prejudice may work by these forms of misattribution. One who has a
bad experience with a person who has a salient characteristic may generalize the
cause of that experience to others with that characteristic, even if that characteristic is
unrelated to the cause of the bad experience. Assume, for instance, that X is robbed
by an African-American who needs money to support a drug habit and who has no
legitimate source of funds. Because the robber's African-American characteristic may
be more observable than his drug addiction or his economic status, X may generalize
that robbers are African-Americans rather than drug users or poor people. See
GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
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individuals dressed in black clothing) would be greater than is warranted by the underlying justification for the rule.
Thus, the absence of a causal relationship between the factual
predicate for the rule and its justification can be viewed in large part
as a question of the excess costs generated by the rule as it restricts
activity without conferring offsetting benefits. In this sense, the same
adverse social result would obtain if the problem were not that the
rule was based on a faulty (or "spurious" 16 ) factual predicate, but that
the rule was formulated at an inappropriate level of precision. Assume, for instance, that a legislature properly identified dogs as the
source of the disruption and enacted a legal rule that barred dogs
from restaurants. Schauer implies that the rule would still be overinclusive because it excludes all dogs, including seeing-eye dogs that are
trained to be well-behaved, and that actually are useful, thereby generating benefits in excess of costs. (The rule would also be underinclusive, since, as Schauer notes, small children and other animals might
be equally disruptive. 17 For purposes of making my point here, however, I can focus only on the overinclusive elements of the rule, with
the understanding that the same analysis follows with respect to its
underinclusive elements.) One might, therefore, wish to adjust the
"no dogs allowed" rule, either legislatively in its initial formulation or
judicially at the point of application, to permit an exception for seeing-eye dogs.
But it may be that it is difficult for rule appliers (restaurant owners or courts hearing cases of seeing-eye dog owners who were improperly excluded from restaurants) to determine whether the dog in
question really was a seeing-eye dog. This difficulty would mean that
rule appliers would sometimes admit dogs that were not seeing-eye
dogs, in which case the unwanted disruption would occur, and refuse
admission to some dogs that were seeing-eye dogs, in which case the
dog owner would be denied a benefit unnecessarily. In addition, we
would have incurred the decisionmaking costs related to the determination of the status of the dog. If, in fact, these decisions would have
to be made with substantial regularity (for example, every dog owner
wishing admission to the restaurant would claim that her dog was a
seeing-eye dog), we might be better off simply rejecting the exception
and implementing the flat rule, even though we know that it would
generate results inconsistent with the rule's justification on occasion.
Here, the costs and benefits of the flat rule would differ from those
16 SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 27 (stating that only those generalizations causally
related to a rule's justification qualify as nonspurious factual predicates for that rule).
17 Id. at 28.
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that applied with a more precise rule that gave additional discretion to
rule appliers; but if the costs of rule application are sufficiently great,
then a rule that denies discretion may be the one that is formulated at
an optimal level of precision, notwithstanding that it still generates
"erroneous" decisions, given the justification for the rule.
The fact that rules are probabilistic rather than particularistic,
that they intentionally omit some relevant facts that we would take
into account were we to make decisions about what to do in a particular case through a process of comprehensive consideration of all its
circumstances, accounts for the necessarily underinclusive and overinclusive nature of rules. While that characteristic may be inherent in
what it means to be a rule, it also suggests a limiting feature of rules.
For if we formulate rules in order to guide behavior, then in some
cases we necessarily incur the costs I referred to above that attend any
deviation between the conduct dictated by the rule and its justification. Our willingness, for the sake of minimizing the total costs related to a rule, to eschew rule formulation that tracks justifications as
closely as possible means that there will be cases in which the rule is to
be applied even though we know that the rule does not fit. Thus,
when we seek an optimal level of precision in rules, we are fully aware
that those rules will sometimes generate a result different from the
one that would have followed from a more particularized inquiry that
applied directly the substantive justifications for the rule.
The search for optimality typically requires the articulation of a
rule that reflects what we believe will occur in a majority of the situations in which the factual predicate for the rule occurs. At times, however, we may be able to identify a subset of cases in which the factual
predicate for the rule exists, but in which there are additional factors
that reduce the probability that the justification for the rule will be
vindicated by the rule's application. Where these circumstances can
be identified, the legislature may create an exception, often identified
by a "provided, however" clause that limits the application of the rule.
For instance, I have suggested that the "holder in due course" rule,
which allows certain transferees of negotiable instruments to take free
from claims and defenses that would have been available to the party
liable on the instrument if asserted against the transferor, is best understood as a means of placing losses on those parties best positioned
to avoid them. On occasion, however, even those who qualify for the
privileged status of holder in due course may be better positioned
than the party liable on the instrument. If those rare exceptions can
be identified by verifiable and unique characteristics that remove the
subset from the probabilistic conception that undergirds the rule,
then the formulation of a more highly tailored rule, based on a differ-
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ent probability, might be superior to a rule that gave all holders in
due course the same rights. That desire for optimal precision, therefore, might explain why even a holder in due course takes subject to
defenses that the maker is an infant, or incompetent, or acted under
duress, since those factual predicates will significantly reduce the
probabilistic link to the justification for the general rule (placing
losses on parties best able to avoid them).18
But it is one thing to be able ex ante to identify salient characteristics that make the rule inapplicable to a subset of cases, and quite
another to attempt to carve out exceptions at the point of application.
That is not to say that courts are incapable of undertaking particularistic analysis at the point of application. Indeed, the overinclusiveness
and underinclusiveness of legislatively created rules suggests just the
opposite. But if the optimal level of precision takes into account the
costs of applying the rule, then there is a limited degree to which the
rule can be amended by ad hoc decisionmaking without incurring
suboptimal investments in getting the application of the rule "right."
From the perspective of institutional design, formulation of the rule
as a precise command may signal a legislative intention to preclude
further judicial inquiry into the fit between the specified characteristics and the justification for the rule in individual cases, even though
all would agree that the result in some cases will be to apply the rule
to facts that do not fit the underlying justification. It is in this sense
that one can make sense of the claim that "the optimal decision procedure may not be the one aimed at producing the best result for each
case."1 9 Trying to capture the benefits of rules may therefore lead
them to be drafted in a manner that assigns courts a relatively inactive
role, since once the rule is formulated at an optimal level of precision,
judicial inquiry to determine whether an unmentioned exception
should apply necessarily alters the optimality calculation.
That the level ofjudicial inquiry to detect exceptions is fixed by
an optimally precise rule might not be problematic were the optimal
level of precision static. But the point of optimality is more likely to
be dynamic. Recall that the relationship between the factual predi18 See Gillette, supra note 12, at 237-43.
19 SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 101. Schauer continues:
A decision procedure that aims to optimize in every case may be self-defeating, producing worse results in the aggregate than a decision procedure with
more modest ambitions.... To put it differently, rule-based decision-making can be seen to be intrinsically and logically conservative (in the nonpolitical sense of that word), abjuring the possibility of complete optimization in
an attempt to avoid disaster.
Id. at 101-02.
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cate for the rule and its justification is what undergirds our presumption that the rule will be appropriately applied in each of the cases in
which that factual predicate exists, even though we know that there
will be misfits. What leads us to apply the rule in the face of that
knowledge is our assumption that the exceptional cases are sufficiently rare as to make particularistic inquiry into their existence
wasteful.
Obviously, then, our effort to draft the optimal rule means an
optimal level of these "erroneous" results. That means not only that
we wish to get the initial approximation of the optimal rule correct,
but also that we want to be aware of shifts in technology or behavior
that might create a new and different level of precision to become
optimal. We may learn by application of the rule that the level of
precision that we once thought optimal is no longer the case, or never
was the case. Technological shifts may, for instance, be warranted by
developments in fact-finding that reduce errors in decisions at the
point of application.2 0 Thus, more accurate means of determining
driver's actual speeds may facilitate implementation of a precise speed
limit and cause a shift in the optimal level of precision of a safe driving rule. Or the development of DNA evidence may facilitate accurate determinations of guilt or innocence. To return to the holder-indue-course case, the amount of contracting by children may have increased so dramatically since the formulation of the "infancy" exception that it is no longer the case that subsequent holders can be said
to be better positioned than children to detect fraud in the underlying transaction. Alternatively, we may learn about consequences of
the rule that were disregarded when it was initially formulated and
that make its application more costly than was initially assumed. Recall, for instance, the debacle over the addition of fire retardents to
children's pajamas that was discovered to have a greater threat of cre21
ating cancer risks than a promise of saving children from burning.
Finally, we may come to learn that the rule admits of so many exceptions that the original "optimal" level of precision that once obtained
no longer does (or never did) because the number of cases arguably
claimed as exceptions is too great.
The problem, of course, is that once courts are informed that the
mandate for an optimal level of precision requires them not to make
20 I believe that this is what Sunstein refers to when he speaks of rules being
outrun by changing circumstances, with his examples being the regulation of banking
and telecommunications. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 955,
993-94 (1995).
21 See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulationof CancerRisks in ConsumerProducts.
1972-1981, 67 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1323-32 (1981).
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particularistic inquiries, they have no avenue for determining that the
relationship assumed between the factual predicate and the justification for the rule has changed. Instead, courts that interpret precision
as a signal to apply the rule woodenly may ignore opportunities to reexamine the probabilistic assumptions of the rule. The extent to
which this effect prevails depends on the source of the shift away from
initial relationship between the factual predicate and the justification
for the rule. Where the change emerges from some technological advance (whether that advance alters the nature of the prior relationship or demonstrates that the presumed relationship never existed),
there may be alternative, nonjudicial mechanisms for reassessing the
factual predicate on which the rule is based. Those who discover a
new technology can more easily capture its benefits if that technology
is accepted, or at least not disfavored by the extant legal rule. Thus,
they have incentives to urge the adoption of legal rules that take ad22
vantage of their discovery, both in legislative and judicial forums.
But the changes that render the assignments of institutional roles
suboptimal may not come from some external discovery, but instead
from the strategic reactions to those assignments by the very agents
who are subject to the legal rule. That individuals would change their
behavior in reaction to a legal rule is, of course, frequently the motivation for implementing the rule. When we enact speed limits, we do so
in the hope that individuals who previously exceeded those speeds will
no longer do so. Those who are the targets of legal rules, however,
may seek to avoid the dictates of a rule by adjusting their behavior in a
manner that eludes the letter of the law. For instance, they may
purchase radar detectors or speed only when driving in a pack of
other speeders or on roads they believe to be infrequently patrolled.
Their ability to act strategically depends on the likelihood that their
conduct will be detected and sanctioned.
Rather than inducing individuals to circumvent the rule, however, individuals may take advantage of the allocation of institutional
roles created by the rule to avoid detection. I have suggested that our
epistemic uncertainty about the relationship between the factual predicate of the rule and its justification is frequently resolved by creating
a presumption that is based on the rule that we believe would apply in
most cases in which we did a particularistic analysis that allowed us to
know the "true" state of affairs. Recall that applying a presumption
22 Of course, this is not always the case, since the technological information may
be discovered by those who would not benefit from disclosure of the new information. Think, for instance, of allegations that those involved in the manufacture of
asbestos or cigarettes were aware of the hazards of their products.
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means that there will be some cases that do not fit .the state of affairs
assumed by the presumption to exist, but we do not think it is worth
our while to make the additional inquiry that is necessary to distinguish those cases in which the presumption is appropriate- from -those
in which it is inappropriate. Once a rule embodies a presumption
that forecloses further inquiry into the facts of a specific case, however, parties who might have avoided antisocial conduct out of fear
that subsequent particularistic inquiries would lead to detection and
sanction will now suffer less disincentive. These behavioral reactions
may mean that the rule is "abused," a situation that leads us to allege
that someone has violated the spirit, if not the letter of the law.2 3 But
if the enactment of the rule carries with it the implication that it has
been initially articulated at an optimal level of precision, then the consequence that particularistic inquiries into the fitness of the rule in
this case are to be avoided reduces the chances that either detection
or sanction will occur. For instance, careless drivers may use the
stated speed limit as a shield, and drive at a speed that is excessive
given the condition of their automobiles (e.g., poor suspension, broken signal lights), but still within the stated limit. The combined result of these abuses should seem familiar given our understanding of
moral hazard. An insurer who sets premiums based on an existing
number of accidents must consider that the very act of providing insurance may increase risk-taking by insureds and thus increase accident rates above those on which the premiums were initially based.
Similarly, the result in our case is that the constraint on courts implemented in the name of an optimal level .of inquiry could itself alter
the identity of that optimal point. Of course, the possibility that individuals would change their behavior once the optimal rule was announced should itself be reflected in the formulation of the rule. But
because the very notion of drafting the rule at an optimal level of
precision entails making decisions under conditions of imperfect information about the future effects of the rule, it is possible, perhaps
likely, that once the rule is implemented, we discover that our conjecture about those effects was incorrect.
The consequence of defining "optimal precision" under these
conditions may be made clearer by examining an example from a current debate in commercial and corporate law concerning the proper
scope of judicial intervention to police the behavior of creditors, an

23 See, e.g., United States v. Grisvold, 57 F.Sd 291, 298 (3d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1990); Robbins v. Indiana
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 786, 793 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
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area known as "lender liability."24 Disputes arise largely when creditors
call existing loans or refuse to make further extensions of credit relying on a contractual entitlement to call defaults when they deem
themselves "insecure," or otherwise express concern about the borrower's financial stability, notwithstanding the absence of any discrete
event that threatens the borrower's venture. One can imagine both
malign and benign reasons why a creditor would accelerate a debt
pursuant to such a clause. On the malign side, a creditor might be
able to take advantage of interest rate shifts since the loan was made if
the creditor could now reloan the same funds at a higher rate. Alternatively, the creditor may have animosity towards the borrower for
reasons that have nothing to do with the viability of the borrower's
business. 25 On the benign side, a borrower may obviously encounter
difficulties as a result of factors not described in the loan agreement
by a specific event of default, but that nevertheless objectively
threaten the prospect that the creditor will receive repayment.
Given that we could imagine either malign and benign explanations for loan accelerations pursuant to the clause, we could either
formulate a presumption about the motivation of a creditor based on
what we believe is the conduct of creditors generally, or we could enable courts to make a particularistic inquiry about the motivations of
the creditor in each case. Those who contend that ad hoc inquiry is
appropriate point to the presence of an obligation of "good faith"
under which creditors operate as the doctrinal basis for judicial investigation. 26 My analysis to this point suggests that whether we believe
that courts should use general principles of commercial law, such as
an obligation to act in "good faith," to police creditor misconduct depends on whether we believe that the costs of judicial intervention
exceed the benefits of such a vague rule, administered in a particularistic manner. Assume, for instance, that creditors on balance exercise
24 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131
(1989); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for
Remote Risks, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 565-74 (1990); Dennis M. Patterson, A Fablefrom
the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrookon Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REv. 503 (1991).
25 This seems to be the nature of the allegation in a well-known case of lender
liability, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761 (6th Cir. 1985). In that case,
the court determined that the bank had refused to make further advances under a
line of credit arrangement because of a personality conflict between the lender and
borrower. But the court also noted that this conflict arose out of a bank officer's
disapproval of K.M.C.'s management philosophy. If the nature of the personality conflict truly evolved from concerns about the manner in which the borrower was operating its business, the lender is less susceptible to the claim that personal animus, rather
than financial considerations, motivated the refusal to approve additional advances.
26 See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 24.
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,good faith on those occasions in which they deem themselves "insecure." This is a plausible scenario, since we can imagine reasons why
both creditors and borrowers would prefer to have such a clause in a
loan agreement. The borrower might treat such a clause as a signal
of its willingness to have the lender monitor the borrower's business
and its confidence in the success of the enterprise being financed with
the loan proceeds; the creditor might consider such a clause to be
necessary in light of the difficulty of enumerating all possible events
that give rise to insecurity about the borrower's business. For instance, the lender may be concerned that the borrower will use the
creditor's money to pursue a business plan substantially more risky
than the one that the borrower proposed at the time that the loan was
27
procured.
Under these circumstances, the role we are willing to assign
courts to police a creditor's use of a "deems itself insecure" clause may
depend on whether we believe that, on balance, the malign or the
benign story accounts for the cases that appear before courts. To the
extent that we believe that creditors typically accelerate payment only
when they have good reason to do so, but that disgruntled borrowers
(or their surrogates, such as trustees in bankruptcy after the borrower's business has met its demise in alleged reaction to the creditor's inappropriate suspension of credit) still bring suits against
creditors in the hope that they can shift to creditors responsibility for
the business failure, we may want to reduce judicial involvement in
the credit termination decision. Of course our willingness to reduce
judicial involvement does not mean that creditors never misbehave; it
means only that we believe that creditors will tend not to misbehave
and that the likelihood of misbehavior in any particular case is sufficiently small as to foreclose investigation of lender misbehavior in all
cases. Our willingness to accept what we consider to be only occasional errors in granting effective immunity to misbehaving creditors
is enhanced by our concern that particularistic judicial application of
a vague standard (as in the case of the "seeing-eye dog" exception)
will generate errors that more than offset the gains of ad hoc decision
making. Courts and juries, sympathetic to failed businesses, may find
misbehavior where none existed, and are also likely to leave some
cases of actual misbehavior undetected, so that some costs of judicial
investigation will be wasted.
Thus, an optimally precise rule for lender liability might deny
courts the ability to undertake intensive monitoring of creditors who
27 See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,86 COLUM. L. REv.
901 (1986).
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use "insecurity" clauses to terminate credit, notwithstanding that some
creditors will thereby avoid liability for bad faith terminations. The
result depends on beliefs that (1) as a probabilistic matter, creditors
are unlikely to terminate credit in bad faith, that is, there exist sufficient extrajudicial checks on strategic behavior by creditors that the
marginal benefits generated by judicial policing are small; (2) there is
no subset of cases in which courts making more particularistic inquiries can readily verify some salient characteristic (as in the infancy, incompetency, or duress holder in due course cases) as a surrogate for
bad faith terminations; and (3) courts applying a general "good faith"
standard to make particularistic inquiries will make frequent errors
that generate both false positives (imposing liability on lenders who
terminated credit facilities in good faith), and false negatives (finding
no liability on lenders who terminated in bad faith). That judicial
errors will be frequent seems inevitable, given that courts are essentially attempting the difficult task of discerning the bank's motivations
for terminating credit. The existence of extrajudicial checks also
seems likely, given that financers operate in relatively competitive
markets, so that a reputation for prematurely terminating credit facilities would likely cost the malefactor profitable business. Given that
judicial intervention will be costly and (correctly applied) would not
likely discover substantial lender misbehavior, we might expect to see
the development of a legal rule that gave courts limited authority to
28
intervene in termination decisions.
One might object that courts could at least intervene to determine whether there is some reason to believe that further inquiry
would reveal misbehavior. I take it that this is the nature of the claim
in Schauer's advocacy of what he calls "presumptive positivism." That
claim is directed at the force of a rule designed to govern a set of cases
rather than to the probability that it would be found to be appropriate
for application after particularistic consideration of one of the cases
within the set.29 But the effect is much the same when applied to the

search for an optimally designed rule predicated on probability. The
purported effect of presumptive positivism is that courts will apply the
favored, though incompletely considered rule unless "the reasons for
overriding are perceived by the decisionmaker to be particularly
strong." 0 Schauer perceives but rejects one problem with such an
28 See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1990).
29

See SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 203.

30 Id. at 204. The possibility that application of the rule would produce an erroneous or suboptimal result in the particular case before the court would not constitute a strong reason for overriding its application. Id.
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analysis, that is, that courts will have to consider "rebutting considerations" in every case subject to the presumptive rule in order to determine whether the presumption should be rebutted, but then will be
unable to ignore those factors in cases initially considered to be insufficiently egregious to avoid the presumptive rule. Schauer believes instead that "decisionmakers can tell the difference between a factor
that would control were the decision process particularized and a factor that does not control because of the presumption or burden of
31
persuasion that prevails in a particular decisional environment."
I have little difficulty with that argument. But if the same logic
applies to the cost-saving feature of the presumption, the presumptive
nature of the rule poses an additional difficulty. As Sunstein suggests,
"the mere possibility of an exception or an excuse in all or almost all
cases involving rules ...means that there is a possibility of an exception or an excuse everywhere, or almost everywhere."3 2 Admitting
that the "rebutting considerations" must be investigated in every case
means that much of the savings that the presumption purported to
create is ultimately lost as each party adversely affected by the presumption has both the incentive and the opportunity to invite the
court to rebut it. The result is that a more wooden, or irrebuttable
form of presumption may be necessary if the rule is to capture the
benefits that it purports to create. It may be that we minimize costs
when we simply recognize that there will be some cases in which application of the presumption leads to the "wrong" result, but do nothing
to rectify the situation.
But this realization gives rise to an additional difficulty, if our
concern is to ensure a relationship between the factual predicate for a
rule and its underlyingjustification. Once we announce that the optimal form of the rule precludes courts from making particularistic inquiries, creditors who might otherwise have avoided strategic
terminations may now engage in them with impunity. Creditors who
might not have taken advantage of increased interest rates or acted
against debtors out of personal spite for fear of judicial correctives
may now feel more freedom to act in a self-interested manner without
judicial detection. The result is that the mix of malign and benign
terminations could change sufficiently to warrant a different rule if we
were aware of the new proportions. The very fact that courts are not
involved in the process of detecting strategic terminations, however,
means that we will not easily become aware of the frequency of creditor stratagems. The rule that assigns a limited role to courts thus con31
32

Id. at 205.
See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 987.
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tains the basis for the perpetuation of the existing substantive rule.
The very act of foreclosing judicial inquiry thwarts the evidence necessary to permit reversal or revision.
The result is that certain rules, once entrenched, become subject
to a form of irreversibility. They are based on certain empirical assumptions that may be true at the time of the rule's promulgation.
But the existence of the rule simultaneously induces actors to change
their behavior in ways that contradict the presumptive behavior that
underlies the rule, and retards subsequent re-examination of the rule
to see if its empirical foundations remain intact. The quest for an
optimally precise formulation of the rule, therefore, is frustrated by
the dynamism of reactions to the rule once it has been articulated.
IV.

RULES TO SECURE COOPERATION

My discussion to this point suggests that the conservative or inertial effects of a rule will be greatest if the rule is designed in a manner
that precludes a potential rulemaker (usually the judiciary, but theoretically the legislature as well 33 ) from revisiting its empirical founda-

tions. The argument to this point has involved rules that are based on
probabilities of a specific sort. Those rules were promulgated in the
belief that their factual predicates were causally related to their justifications. Thus, in any case in which the factual predicate occurred, it
could be presumed that application of the rule would forestall the
harm to be avoided or confer the benefit to be obtained by the rule.
In this sense, they are what I call "majoritarian rules," because they
reflect a presumption about what will occur a majority of the time that
their factual predicates occur. At the same time, the fact that those
consequences follow a majority of the time, but not every time that the
factual predicate occurs, and that the consequences to be regulated
can occur even without the existence of the factual predicate, is what
gives rise to the possibility that behaviors may shift, causing the
majoritarian presumption to fail.
But not all rules have their origins in efforts to instantiate a presumption of what consequences follow a majority of the time that
their factual predicates appear. Rather, some rules may be formu33 Legislatures are typically allowed to override the acts of their predecessors and
to initiate the inquiries necessary to reverse existing rules. But some legislation requires supermajority votes, which reduces the likelihood of reversals or revisions of
existing rules on the same subject. Constitutional provisions, of course, also limit the
scope of reversal. But these requirements usually reflect that something other than a
purely majoritarian rule, based on what most people prefer under a given set of conditions, is at stake, and are thus perhaps better subsumed under the subsequent discussion of varying conceptions of costs associated with rules.
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lated simply to create a practice to which agents ire expected to conform because conformity will generate greater value for all concerned,
including those agents who conform to the rule. Even nonaltruistic
individual agents desire to behave in a socially rational manner in
these situations, because doing so also serves self-interest. It is the
existence of a signal of how to conform, or to cooperate, rather than
any predictions about what will follow from the rule's factual predicates, that provides the value of the rule. Thus, the rule is probabilistic in the sense that, once announced, agents who find themselves in
situations characterized by the factual predicates for the rule will be
likely to follow the dictates of the rule, since the agents seek to cooperate, as long as all other similarly situated agents also cooperate.
This is obviously a different notion of a probabilistic relationship than
the previously discussed concept that assumes a connection between
factual predicates and justification for the rule. Nevertheless, the fact
that agents will coordinate in the manner dictated by the rule indicates that the factual predicate for the rule is linked to its justification,
that is, to generate cooperation.
A.

Signals of Coordination

Rules that signal coordination points may be useful in either of
two situations. In some situations, all parties have a common objective
of cooperation, but cannot easily communicate about what the agreed
point of cooperation should be. The announcement of a rule simply
reflects their preferences to have a common signal of cooperative action. We may be indifferent as to the content of the rule (at least as
among multiple possibilities), but not indifferent as to its existence,
because the rule allows coordination of activity the value of which
would be greatly reduced if coordination could not occur. We might,
in the classic example, be indifferent as to whether people drove on
the right or left side of the road, at least prior to the manufacture of
automobiles with steering wheels on one side of automobile or the
other, but not indifferent as to everyone driving on the same side of
the road as everyone else. The choice between the two possible rules,
however, has nothing to do with probabilistic relationships between
factual predicates and justifications (although each of the candidates
may be based on probabilistic reasoning).
The second situation involves situations of potential conflict because agents, acting strategically, would otherwise pursue strategies
that are individually rational, but socially irrational. These activities
typically take the form of prisoner's dilemmas or chicken games, in
which each agent's concern about what other agents might do leads
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all the relevant agents to behave, self-interestedly, in a manner that
deprives them of gains that would be available if they cooperated.
Legal rules avoid these losses by providing information about the firstbest solution and creating an enforceable obligation for each agent to
cooperate.
In each case in which cooperation is desired, a rule that induces
that cooperation simultaneously frustrates reversibility if, subsequently, a preferable point of cooperation is discovered. This is alluded to by Schauer when he notes in his discussion of rules that solve
coordination problems that the primacy of that objective means that
agents, who do not want to deviate from what others do, "will tend
towards the entrenchment of general rules even in the face of inclina8' 4
tions to modify them at the moment of application.
Here I think that Schauer's account of the evolution and stability
of the rule is quite correct; but its implications are more problematic
and robust than his account suggests. Recall that the rule to solve the
coordination problem is not selected to reflect a probabilistic view of
the true state of affairs, other than to suggest that there are multiple
equilibria that could be selected and one prominent solution may be
particularly salient to those subject to the rule.3 5

But once we create

a solution to the coordination problem, that solution becomes entrenched in ways that, again, impede its reversibility, notwithstanding
that the conditions that led to its initial selection have changed. In
Schauer's account of the process, that entrenchment is the consequence of deference to community. Individuals living under rules developed to solve coordination problems may confront situations in
which modifications of a rule seem superior to its wooden application.
Nevertheless, if those individuals fear that subsequent actors who face
the same situation will fail to make the modification that seems desirable, the first set of individuals will, in the name of preserving coopera36
tion, "resist the urge to make a seemingly desirable modification."
Thus, the statement of the rule remains quite general, even though
the optimal level of precision might properly require a more highly
tailored statement of the rule and exceptions to it. The very collective
34
35

36

SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 165.
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONE='G

57-58 (1960).
SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 165. Schauer continues:
The ability of the rules of language or the rules of the road to work, therefore, may be largely a result of the willingness of co-operatively inclined participants in the rule-system to resist urges to make the rules better, for they
can be less sure that other agents will make the same modification than that
other agents now employ the unmodified rule.
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action problem that the rule was promulgated to solve stands as an
obstacle to its revision.
Again, I have no difficulty with this account as far as it goes. The
problem is that it understates the difficulty of reversing (or revising)
the rule initially laid down beyond the inertial concerns that affect all
legal rules. Assume that we all agree that a coordination solution initially settled on is socially suboptimal at the current time (even though
it may have been correct at the time of its initial promulgation). For
instance, a country that initially decided that drivers should drive on
the left might come to realize that most countries drive on the right
and that most motor vehicles are designed for driving on the right. As
a result, citizens in the country that follows the minority rule have less
access to motor vehicles than do citizens of other countries. This is
not to say that the initial decision was "wrong." To the contrary, it was
a perfectly appropriate decision under the conditions of uncertainty
in which it was made (there being no prominent solution at the time
of decision). It is only to say that the decision becomes costly in light
of subsequent events. We can imagine, for instance, that at the time
when the decision was made, the decision matrix for any given driver
(A) and all other drivers (B) for driving on either the left or the right
side of the road looked something like the following:
B
Left

Left
1, 1

Right
-1, -1

Right

-1, -1

1, 1

A
In short, the original situation was one in which there were two
coordination equilibria, the lower-right and upper-left cells, but we
would have been indifferent between them. But the passage of time
may alter the situation, so that we are no longer indifferent, because
the decision matrix now looks like the following:
B
Left

Left
1, 1

Right
-1, -1

Right

-1, -1

2, 2

A
It would be better if all persons drove on the right, even though
things are better with everyone driving on the left than if some drove
on each side. Thus, for the reasons that Schauer illustrates, drivers on
the left have no reason to reverse the rule. While conventional plays
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are typically seen as solutions to collective action problems,3 7 the articulation of the solution through promulgation of a rule may also frustrate efforts to reverse the rule when conditions would warrant it. It is
in the nature of the coordination equilibrium that parties will "stick"
to their positions, because no one person can improve matters by himself or herself through unilateral movement. The preferred position
is, therefore, individually inaccessible.
It is tempting to say at this point that legislative solutions should
be available to solve the problem of inertia. After all, the legislature
can simply mandate the new coordination equilibrium; since all would
agree on the improvement, the standard interest group concerns will
not arise. Thus, the parties need not cooperate. All that is necessary
is that one party apprise the centralized decisionmaker of the new
solution. Once that is accomplished, the decisionmaker should be
able to impose the new equilibrium on all parties, all of whom will be
satisfied with the change.
Features of cooperation games, however, may exacerbate collective action problems at the legislative level. The very fact that all parties will benefit from the change means that free riding problems are
likely to be greater in this situation. Given that the steps taken to
effect the underlying change-assembling the information, informing
the legislature-are costly, anyone who incurs these costs decreases
the net benefit from these changes, and would not suffer that fate if
some other party undertook the same task. Given that all would benefit from the change, the opportunities for free riding are greater than
in the case in which a discrete group would enjoy idiosyncratic benefits from the changed rule. Further, the transaction costs involved in
shifting from the existing coordination point to the "superior" one
may eliminate all the gains, so that the current rule is efficient, even if
it would not have been selected initially if we had known at that time
all that we know now.
It may be, of course, that the benefits of the rule are not uniformly distributed. Traffic sign manufacturers, for instance, may benefit disproportionately from the change and thus be willing to lead
the charge. But if the "improvement" produces unequal benefits
throughout the society, the resulting bargain about the division of
benefits may frustrate efforts to reverse the rule. Assume, for instance,
that the proposed change would alter the payoffs in the lower right
cell from 1, 1 to 1, 2. There is still reason to change from the upper
left to the lower right cell, but now A has nothing to gain from the
change and may attempt to hold up B for some share of B's gain.
37

See RUSSELL

HARDIN, COLLECTIVE AcTION

156-61 (1982).
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Alternatively, if the payoffs in the lower right cell change from 1, 1 to
2, 3, A again has incentives to hold out in order to induce B to share
some of the greater surplus that B realizes from the change.
These inequalities are likely to be endemic in coordination
problems because the initial assignment of entitlements, even though
it arose from relatively benign circumstances, is likely to privilege a
particular set of persons who are likely to oppose any alteration of the
existing rule. Having invested in a system of driving on the left, a discrete group of interests (including domestic motor vehicle producers
who must retool their products and then face competition from increased imports), are likely to oppose any such shift. The problem of
preserving overly generalized coordination rules, that is, does not
arise so much from the community-preserving element of coordination solutions, but from its opposite, the entreaties of groups with an
intense interest in maintaining the status quo, notwithstanding that
the conditions that gave rise to that status quo have changed. But the
presence of groups with intense interests in the status quo is simply an
example of the systemic biases against reversibility that I earlier suggested were outside my major concern here. And if there is a sufficient interest group that would benefit from the change (potential
automobile importers and foreign exporters), then they may coalesce
in a manner that facilitates legislative adoption of the new rule. Thus,
the possibility of legislative solutions falls outside my claim that the
nature of the rule adds a dimension to the problem of reversibility.
Similarly, one might contend that the problem here is simply one
of information.3 8 All parties might move to the lower right cell if they
knew the payoffs in that cell, since all parties will be better off in that
cell. Thus, as long as we publicize the relevant information, reversibility should occur. The problem with this solution is that it will not be
enough that all parties have the relevant information. Even if I know
the payoffs in the lower right cell, I will not move unless I believe that
you know what I know and are willing to act on that information. And
you will only act on the information if you know that I have the relevant information and you know that I know you have the relevant information. In short, all parties must know that all other parties have
the information, and that all parties know that all other parties know
they have the information. The knowiledge requirement need not regress too much in order to realize that it poses significant difficulties
in a multiparty universe. Thus, some sort of legal regime may be necessary not simply to solve the coordination problem, but to alter a
solution on which there has been prior agreement.
38 I am grateful to Steve Walt for discussion on this point.
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Coordinationand MajoritarianDefaults

These points may be made clearer by comparing rules that identify an arbitrary coordination point with those rules that are intended
only to replicate the specific preferences of parties engaged in the
activity that the rule addresses. Here, the rule at issue again has its
source in some objective other than inhibiting one agent from inflicting harm on another. Instead, the function is to codify a practice
that parties subject to that practice would presumably follow anyway.
By embodying the practice within a legal rule, the parties avoid any
residual uncertainty about their obligations or the costs of negotiating
about the scope of those obligations. This is frequently characteristic
of the rules of contract, and sometimes of the rules of tort. Here, I
think that reversibility is less of a problem, but largely for the reason
that makes the argument in the lender liability case more apparent.
Contract rules typically take the form of default rules, around
which parties are free to contract, but that apply in the face of contractual silence. These rules tend to be drafted in a manner that simply reflects the rule that we believe would be preferred by most parties
whose activity is subject to the rule. At the same time, transforming
that rule into a default for those who enter into bargains offers the
advantage of reducing transactions costs, because only those parties so
idiosyncratic as to want to opt out of the default rule will have to bargain about the contractual term at all. 39 For instance, rules concerning the risk of loss for goods sold tend to place the risk on the party
who has control and dominion over the goods, regardless of passage
of title, on the understanding that any such party can more cheaply
protect the goods against loss, and thus would be the party to whom
most contract parties would assign the risk. There is an additional
assumption that underlies this rule, however. Implicitly, we believe
that the parties to the contract internalize virtually all the costs related
to the choices they make. That is, they serve as surrogates for third
parties, such as their customers and employees, so that no external
effects go unconsidered in their decision to create a bargain, since
they would ultimately bear the costs of all these effects. For instance, a
contract that imposed excess costs on customers would cause sellers to
lose business to competitors. Hence, there is little reason to believe
39 This defense of majoritarian principles overstates the case for majoritarian defaults a bit. It might be the case that a party would actually prefer an alternative to the
default rule, but the expected costs of accepting the default rule are less than the
costs of contracting around it. In such a case, the party would actually prefer a different default rule, thus he or she cannot be said to have preferences that coincide with
the existing default rule.
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that the bargain these parties would reach differs materially from the
calculus that would be struck from a social perspective, since the parties serve as appropriate proxies for the society at large. 4° Thus, drafting the legal rule in terms of preferences of a majority of those who
contract under conditions subject to the rule will not vary from a
fuller assessment of the social costs and social benefits that the rule
would generate.
As in the case of the rules with which we began, there is a probabilistic relationship between the factual predicate for default rules and
their justification. The fact that a purchaser obtains possession of
goods means that the purchaser is the better bearer of the risk of loss,
even though title has not passed. Hence, a legal rule that places the
risk of loss on the purchaser in this situation satisfies the probabilistic
relationship that we prefer. And like our prior situations, there will be
cases in which the probabilistically generated rule does not hold true.
Sometimes, sellers may be better able to insure even though they do
not have dominion and control over the goods, or a purchaser who

places an idiosyncratically high value on a good may want to bear the
risk of loss even though she does not yet have possession of it, because
she wants to require the possessor to take certain precautions against
loss. But unlike our prior situations, the bargain element of the situation suggests that strategic behavior is less likely to occur. If the rule is
articulated to reflect the preferences of the majority of parties who
enter into such transactions, and if the parties are able to capture the
benefits (reduced transactions costs) of such a rule, then they have
every incentive to discover and disclose any change in the relationship
between the factual predicates that undergird the rule and its justification. Where rules reflect majoritarian defaults, the parties whose preferences are reflected in those defaults have both the incentives and
the opportunity to internalize the costs of the rule and to reduce the
error involved in making allocations. They, even more than legislators, have every incentive to formulate a rule at the optimal level of
precision, since they personally bear the costs of imprecision. They
therefore similarly have incentives to discover and reverse rules that
no longer serve their intended function of signaling what most similarly situated agents would prefer. Given the low likelihood that the

parties would deviate from an optimal rule at any given time, rules
that arise from majoritarian defaults are less likely than other rules to
suffer from irreversibility.
40 There are obviously circumstances in which this assumption does not hold
true. For instance, parties may contract for price fixing arrangements that impose
substantial costs on others that are not internalized by the parties to the bargain.
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EXPECTED COST CALCULATIONS AND REVERSIBILITY

To this point, my concern about the reversibility of legal rules has
focused on the capacity of an institution charged with applying the
rule to determine whether the factual predicate for the rule remains
linked to its justification with sufficient probability as to warrant continued use of the rule. Thus, the "no dogs allowed" rule presumes
that, in a substantial majority of cases in which dogs are allowed into
restaurants, they will impose costs on patrons in excess of the benefits
that would be conferred on dog owners if they were allowed free access with their pets. Indeed, it is because the link between the factual
predicate for the rule (disruptive dogs) and the harm to be avoided or
benefit to be conferred is so close that we might initially believe that
rules are readily reversible because any severance between the two will
be easily observed.
Legal rules, however, do not necessarily represent a purely probabilistic relationship between factual predicates and justifications for
the rules. Instead, some rules, far from being linked to probabilities,
may be in direct conflict with the conditions that we believe exist in
the majority of cases where the factual predicate for the rule is found.
We might think of legal rules of this sort as "nonmajoritarian" presumptions or rules. Think, for example, of the presumption that a
criminal defendant is innocent and that thus places on the government the obligation to demonstrate guilt. I doubt that many of us
would contend that the presumption of innocence is rooted in a belief that most persons put on trial are, in fact, innocent. The rationale
for the presumption in such a case has less to do with probabilities
standing alone than with the use of the probability to discount the
harm that would occur were we to employ the opposite presumption.
Our concern in these cases is, therefore, not with what will occur in
the majority of cases to which the rule applies, but with the expected
losses that will materialize in those cases in which application of the
presumption leads to the "wrong" result.
Recall that we understand that there will be some cases in which a
majoritarian rule will not fit, but we apply it without trying to detect
the identity of those cases because the costs of a more particularistic
4
inquiry (that is, the costs of false positives) are not worth incurring. '

Although the rationale for wooden application of the rule typically
seems to be stated in terms of the low probability that the exceptional
case will arise, the existence of nonmajoritarian presumptions suggests that a more complicated analysis really underlies the application
41

See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
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of presumptions generally. In addition to our belief that there is only
a remote probability that any given case would not warrant application
of the presumption, our application of the majoritarian presumption
also implicitly assumes that the costs related to any given instance of
"wrongful" application of the presumption are not very high. For example, when we presume that a creditor will terminate loans only in
good faith, even though we know that some creditors will act in bad
faith, we are implicitly deciding that the social costs related to immunizing the occasional bad actor, discounted by the probability that any
actor falls within that category, are insufficient to warrant further
investigation.
This type of reasoning is familiar from economic explanations of
negligence law. 42 There, for instance, one does not assign liability
based solely on a high probability that an accident will occur if precautions are not taken. Rather, that probability is used to discount the
accident costs that society incurs if the accident does materialize. We
would, for instance, not impose negligence liability on a party who
failed to take precautions against bumping individuals on the subway,
notwithstanding the high incidence of such events, because the harm
caused by such bumping is sufficiently slight that the expected loss
(harm from bumping discounted by its probability) from allowing the
accident is too small to warrant the precaution costs that would be
required to avoid the loss.
43
Of course, this "Learned Hand" test of negligence liability
works to impose liability as well as to immunize against it. Failure to
protect against harms that threaten substantial losses will be considered negligent, even though the probability of their materialization is
quite low. Even, expensive precautions will be justified to protect
against accidents in nuclear power plants, notwithstanding their low
probability, because the consequences that will materialize should the
low probability event materialize is so great. And that is just the point
that obtains with respect to legal rules that are framed in terms of a
nonmajoritarian presumption. Such rules reveal that the costs related
to applying a majoritarian rule in the numerically few cases in which it
does not fit are so significant as to warrant the use of an alternative
rule for all cases. For instance, even if we believe that most criminal
defendants are guilty, thus justifying a majoritarian rule that presumes
42 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
43 The "Learned Hand" test of negligence, in which accident precaution costs are
compared to accident losses that would occur in the absence of precaution discounted by their probability, is attributed to Judge Hand's opinion in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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guilt, the social costs of convicting the few innocent defendants are
considered so great that the expected loss that results from application of such a presumption (costs of convicting the innocent discounted by its probability) render the majoritarian presumption
inappropriate. That is the case even though application of the
nonmajoritarian presumption of innocence generates its own set of
costs, that is, acquittal of some number of guilty defendants. Our use
of the nonmajoritarian presumption implies that those costs are significantly outweighed by the costs related to conviction of the
innocent.44
That we typically form presumptions related to expected losses,
rather than to naked probabilities, seems to me to be uncontroversial.
Take, for example, the common rule that requires a public school to
evacuate all students when a fire alarm rings. If presumptions followed from majoritarian perspectives alone, one might infer that this
rule is based on a belief that when a fire alarm rings, there is, more
probably than not, a fire in the building. But no one who has spent
significant time in a public school believes that there is an actual fire
on the majority of occasions in which alarms are sounded. Thus, a
purely majoritarian view would restate the rule to say that evacuations
should not be ordered when a fire alarm rings, unless there is independent confirmation of a fire. Nevertheless, the costs associated
with an occasional false negative may so exceed the costs associated
with a false positive of a fire, that we are willing to accept a rule that is
inconsistent with our epistemic beliefs about the state of affairs in the
situations to which the rule applies. On a more mundane level, think
of defaults created in computer programs. If I select a file for deletion from my hard drive, the computer asks me if I really want to delete the file and the computer program makes the default answer to
that question "No." Typically, if I have gone through the steps necessary to delete a file, I will have desired that it be deleted, although
occasionally I will have mistakenly chosen a file for deletion. Thus, a
majoritarian default would likely be an affirmative answer to the question of whether I want to delete the selected file. Nevertheless, the
cost of mistakenly deleting a file may be so substantial that, notwithstanding its infrequency, the expected costs of that action exceed the
costs related to the extra step necessary to overcome the default command that cancels the deletion. Or think of more exotic examples,
44 Frederick Schauer's recent work on adverse decisions adopts an assumption
that the cost of wrongful conviction is approximately 20 times as costly as the wrongful
acquittal. See Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidencefor
Adverse Decisions, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 34 n.l1 (1996).
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such as our decisions to avoid risks in the environmental area that
have a low probability of occurring, but that threaten incalculable
harm should they materialize. 45 These risks have been labeled "zeroinfinity" risks insofar as they are highly unlikely (approaching a zero
chance of occurrence) to materialize, but will cause infinite harm
should that remote event come to pass. Again, low probability alone
does not dictate our action, but is instead factored into an expected
loss calculation to determine an appropriate presumption or default
rule.
My concern however is not simply with demonstrating the common phenomenon that presumptions emerge from expected loss calculations rather than from probabilities alone. Rather, my concern
again lies with the implications of that phenomenon for reversibility
of a rule promulgated in accordance with an expected loss calculus
when the factual assumptions underlying the rule turn out to be erroneous or to have changed. Here, again, the limited competence of
certain decisionmaking institutions frustrates efforts to determine the
continuing relationship between factual predicates for the rule and
their justification. The limited competence of both legislatures and
courts, for instance, is severely tested by nonmajoritarian presumptions. An initial difficulty arises simply because an additional calculation (expected loss) is necessary. The decisionmaker must do more
than simply calculate the probability with which the existence of the
factual predicate for a rule generates a particular result, and that additional calculation requires data (losses per incident) that may not be
readily accessible.
The computational problem is exacerbated, however, by the very
nature of the losses that are typically at stake in cases where expected
losses are high, notwithstanding low probabilities. Far more than the
head-counting or rough approximation of frequency that the calculation of probability alone requires, the factors that make expected costs
high in these circumstances tend to be relatively insusceptible to
quantification. Nonmajoritarian rules tend to focus on avoiding salient harms, such as the elimination of a particular species, the potential death of particular school children, or the imprisonment of a
particular individual. These harms tend to entail just the kinds of
costs that defy measurement, for two reasons. First, these harms tend
to bearjust the opposite characteristics of majoritarian default rules in
contract. Recall that in those cases, our sense was that the parties in45 See, e.g., Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and SimilarRisks, 7 EcoLoGw L.Q. 207 (1978); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 495 (1986).
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ternalized essentially all the costs and benefits of the legal rule, and
thus they would have sufficient incentive to contend for a legal rule
that reflected the socially desirable default. For that reason, I suggested reversibility would be facilitated in an appropriate case because
parties affected by an obsolete rule would have sufficient incentives to
alter it. In many of the cases of nonmajoritarian defaults, however,
the relevant costs tend to be diffuse throughout the population (for
example, the demoralization costs related to the fear that innocents
could be arrested and required to bear the burden of disproving
guilt). Hence, there is less reason to believe that the rules that particular parties advocate will reflect socially desirable rules, since those
parties do not internalize the full set of costs and benefits that attend
the rule. Any quantification of harms at the point of application is,
therefore, likely to be incomplete.
Second, the nature of the harms that nonmajoritarian rules seek
to avoid tend to be less tangible, and hence less quantifiable, than the
harms that are at stake in judicially accessible calculations. The very
fact that avoiding an event of low probability still has a significant expected value suggests that the loss will be critical should the event
materialize. But we often attribute that result to a rule because we
cannot easily quantify the relevant harm in a manner that allows it to
be compared with the cost of avoidance. We attribute high expected
costs to these harms because we have particular aversion to the risks
that generate such harms, rather than because these harms destroy
goods or services with a discrete market value that is readily measured.
Think, for instance, of the difficulty we suffer in attempting to value
identifiable lives versus statistical lives, and that thus generates default
rules (such as the fire alarm rule) that require avoiding certain harms,
regardless of their low frequency.4 6 Or think, more specifically, of the

Delaney Clause, which bars the use in food of any additive that is carcinogenic, regardless of the probability that it will induce cancer. 47 In
these areas, we tend to speak of "values," "soft variables," or "incommensurables" rather than in terms of quantifiable and verifiable statistical analyses based on widely accepted computations. Such values or
variables, however, are hardly susceptible to judicial analysis or revision at the point of application or even to legislative reformulation.
Our attitudes towards particular risks might change, but it is difficult
46 The classic treatment is found in Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be
Your Own, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 113, 115-19 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1984).
See also Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1969); E.J. Mishan,
Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687, 693 (1971).

47

21 U.S.CA. § 348(c) (3) (West 1972).
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to imagine how courts or legislatures would revisit precise rules
drafted in light of past attitudes to reverse those rules in light of new
attitudes. Since the expected losses on which rules were originally
based are not susceptible to easy mathematical calculation, it is more
difficult to detect that the factual predicates on which those rules were
based have become unmoored from theirjustifications. Thus, for example, legislators have been unwilling to eliminate the Delaney
Clause to accommodate substances with only minute carcinogenic
properties, even as our understanding of risk assessment has led to
greater acceptance of certain environmental risks. In addition, legislators fail to revise rules that permit marketing of existing substances
that create risks that might be found unacceptable in new substances. 48 The result is that, once formulated, nonmajoritarian rules
that rely on such factors become essentially irreversible because of empirical difficulties involved in demonstrating that the assumptions on
which they were initially based no longer apply or fail to apply in an
individual case.
There is, of course, nothing inherently problematic about
nonmajoritarian rules. Our inability to quantify factors that are relevant to the formulation of a rule does not render the rule illegitimate
or inappropriate. At the same time, we should be aware that such
principles contain inertial effects that are likely to keep them entrenched once formulated. Perhaps our response should be to exercise care in the way we formulate such rules. Legal rules cast in terms
of "reasonableness" permit changes in risk attitudes to be incorporated at the point of application in ways that flat rules do not. A particular substance, for instance, might today be seen as presenting an
unreasonable risk, although that risk may subsequently be seen as
worth incurring in light of the substance's benefits. (Think, for instance, of newly discovered health benefits of aspirin, notwithstanding
that it causes some side effects.) A flat prohibition imposed on the
substance that emerges from risk aversion today may affect marketing
of the substance for a longer period than a rule that denies the use of
"unreasonable substances," and thus prevent realization of the offsetting benefits, even though the two formulations have identical effects
(banning use of the substance) if promulgated today, prior to our discovery of new benefits.

48 The phenomenon of treating existing risk differently from new risks is addressed in Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025
(1983).

1448

NOTRE DAME

VI.

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72:5

CONCLUSION

Legal rules are promulgated for particular times and places, and
thus reflect our understanding of the relationship between factual
predicates and justifications that exist at those times and places. But
understandings, and perhaps the relationships themselves, may
change subsequent to the promulgation of legal rules. If legal rules
are to serve their intended function, those who draft and apply legal
rules must have the capacity to perceive shifts in the underlying relationships and adjust legal rules accordingly. I have indicated some
circumstances in which the nature of the legal rule frustrates that
exercise.
More complicated is the issue of how to address that frustration.
In some cases, different institutions may have different capacities to
adjust the application of legal rules to changed circumstances. Thus,
for instance, if we believe that courts can detect changes in the probabilistic relationship between factual predicate and justification, we
may want to draft legal regulations in terms of broad standards rather
than precise rules in order to permit ex post judicial determinations
rather than ex ante legislative determinations of the appropriate scope
of liability or responsibility. Alternatively, if legal presumptions embody political choices not easily reflected in ad hoc adjudication, then
the rule might be best embodied in a rigid rule from which courts
cannot easily deviate, since they will be relatively incompetent to obtain and evaluate empirical evidence that would justify overriding the
presumption.
More radically, we might create sunset provisions for a broader
range of laws in order to induce decisionmakers to recreate the initial
analysis in order to determine whether it still holds. But the discussion
of optimality suggests that such a step would only be appropriate if we
thought that the problem of irreversibility was sufficiently significant
to warrant incurring the costs related to re-enacting a wide array of
law. If irreversibility is a sufficiently small problem, then this remedy
might well be unwarranted, suggesting (not without irony) that the
problem of irreversibility may itself be inherent in any legal system, or,
irreversible.

